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In Dreams, In Imagination: Suspense, Anxiety and the Cold War in Tim O’Brien’s 
The Nuclear Age 
 
I was a witness.  I saw it happen.  In dreams, in imagination, I watched 
the world end. 
Tim O’Brien, The Nuclear Age 
In Tim O’Brien’s The Nuclear Age the narrator, William Cowling, gazes out his 
airplane window at a United States alight with nuclear explosions.  In Don DeLillo’s 
End Zone a nuclear device explodes in Europe, conflict escalates and cities around the 
world are destroyed.  In Douglas Coupland’s Generation X a supermarket erupts in 
panic as sirens wail, jets are scrambled and a nuclear missile explodes.  The opening 
frames of the film Thirteen Days are lit by the explosions of rocket propellant as a 
missile rises gracefully into the blackness of space.  The earth’s horizon is seen from 
the top of the missile’s arc, and inverts as it heads back downwards.  A nuclear 
explosion follows, more missiles leaping into the air are intercut with further 
explosions, and the sequence ends with a mushroom cloud boiling up to fill the 
screen.1 
 These are iconic Cold War images: the end of the world in a cataclysmic 
release of the energy locked inside matter. What makes these texts significant, though, 
is that these images of the end are placed under elision.  In one form or another, all of 
the episodes described are mental, not physical, events: in The Nuclear Age 
thermonuclear war is a traumatic hallucination of the novel’s troubled protagonist, in 
End Zone it is the climax of a war game played by the apocalypse-obsessed narrator 
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and in Generation X it is a story told amongst a group of friends.  Thirteen Days 
simply leaves its opening sequence unexplained, and the audience is left to infer that it 
was a path history failed to take, for the film goes on to depict the successful attempt 
to avert the war depicted in the opening scenes, during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  As 
readers and viewers we are, therefore, asked to hold these images in suspension, 
frozen in our minds as deferred possibilities. 
 The Nuclear Age is particularly significant because it makes obsession with 
this constantly threatened but deferred possibility the overriding focus of the 
narrative.  The novel’s concern is not with the explosion of the Cold War into nuclear 
heat but with the experience of living with this threat, unresolved, over a long period 
of time, and it explores the psychological consequences of long-term, and seemingly 
unending, fear.  This distinguishes it from most other texts dealing with nuclear 
issues, where resolution is provided either by the, admittedly horrific, depiction of 
nuclear disaster or, in the case of the nuclear thriller, aversion of disaster.  This paper 
begins with a discussion of the distinguishing features of O’Brien’s ‘nuclear anxiety’ 
fiction, which it contextualises in terms of other literary representations of the bomb 
and research into the psychology of Cold War fear.  It then goes on to discuss the 
problems of language and political engagement posed by the literary depiction of 
nuclear anxiety. 
 
Articulating the Nuclear Threat: Fictions of Disaster and Anxiety 
 
In the early evening of Monday 22 October 1962, President Kennedy went public on 
the crisis which brought the world closest to nuclear war.  Appearing on United States 
television to announce the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, he stated that 
‘American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull’s eye of Soviet 
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missiles.’2  This sense of citizens as targets, of nuclear missiles as a modern sword of 
Damocles symbolising the insecurity not just of the great but of the many, might be 
expected to have had profound and far-reaching effects both on the general 
psychological disposition of the populace and, more specifically, on literature of the 
Cold War period.3   After all, for the half century of the Cold War, military nuclear 
technology represented the possibility of destruction on an unprecedented level.  It 
signified not just war, but a threat to civilisation and even the existence of human life.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis may have been the most obvious moment of tension but it 
was also far from the only one.  Less than a year before, American and Soviet tanks 
had rumbled into Berlin to face each other directly in a tense stand off in one of many 
crises over the city, a decade earlier President Eisenhower had threatened the use of 
nuclear weapons to end the Korean War, and two decades after the Cuban Crisis the 
Reagan administration speculated hawkishly that the United States could ‘prevail’ in a 
nuclear war against the Soviet Union.4 
 Yet, despite these moments of heightened tension, and a half century of 
constant threat, nuclear anxiety was in general neglected as a subject in public debate 
and was, seemingly, strangely absent as an explicit focus in literature of the period.  
To have become ‘adjusted’, as Kennedy put it, seems to mean, in general, to have 
suppressed anxieties about nuclear war.  This does not, of course, mean that people 
were unaware of nuclear weapons; nor does it preclude the campaigns against nuclear 
weapons that took place (though these were more extensive in Europe than in the 
United States).  However, what it does mean is that there were only brief periods 
when nuclear issues came to the forefront of public consciousness.  Charts tracing 
levels of public engagement with nuclear issues by, for instance, tracking the number 
of periodical articles on the subject, or the number of opinion polls conducted about it, 
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all tell the same story: there are brief peaks of interest, following international crises, 
or significant technological developments, but at other times (notably from the mid 
1960s to the late 1970s) overt awareness and discussion rapidly fades away.5 
While one explanation for this is that people were simply not concerned or, at 
least, with the exception of those actively campaigning for disarmament, felt unable to 
shape public policy and so made a rational decision to turn to other issues, another 
possibility is opened up by the psychologist Robert Lifton.  In a landmark book, 
Indefensible Weapons, which establishes the central paradigm for psychological 
investigations of nuclear fear, he describes a ‘psychic numbing’ of the population 
during the second half of the twentieth century.6  For Lifton, the mind cannot but be 
overwhelmed when it faces the possibility of nuclear war, and so has to drive nuclear 
fears beneath the surface.  Here they may condition our responses to other aspects of 
our lives, inducing a numbing of emotions and a feeling of disassociation.  Similarly, 
the lurking awareness that the future can be abruptly truncated by nuclear war renders 
the meanings we find in our lives absurd and induces a tendency to live a double life: 
working, socialising, forming relationships and planning for the future, on the one 
hand, and on the other aware that at any point this could be rendered irrelevant by 
nuclear catastrophe.  The scale of nuclear disaster, threatening not only us, but also 
everything that would normally survive us (family and friends; society; art) makes 
this psychological threat distinctively different to that posed by awareness of personal 
mortality. 
Although Lifton’s approach is somewhat speculative, and is not without its 
problems (the most pressing of which is the implication that lack of evidence for 
widespread nuclear fear is itself deployed as evidence for the pervasiveness of that 
fear, because it demonstrates the extent to which people have become numbed), it has 
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been influential on work done by psychologists on the issue.7  Despite its limitations, 
it draws our attention to the important psychological and cultural need, rapidly to 
assimilate, after 1945, a world that was fundamentally changed by the presence of 
nuclear weapons. 
For Lifton, this new world takes the form, within our heads, of a constantly 
present, though frequently suppressed, anxiety.  He quotes, for instance, a study into 
the nuclear fears of American adults who, as children, had experienced ‘duck and 
cover’ air raid drills.  Even though some denied that nuclear fear affected their lives, it 
became apparent, when they were questioned further, that they had a ‘vague sense of 
living under a nuclear shadow, a sense that could not be equated with any particular 
life decision but just hung over one and would never quite go away.’8  Other 
researchers back this up.  Lowell Rubin, for instance, briefly summarises the work of 
five studies, concluding that ‘there is considerable worry or anxiety about the nuclear 
threat in the population at large.’9 
Suspense, the pervasive, if indistinct and frequently repressed, sense that one 
is living always on the cusp, just before nuclear war, becomes, in this reading, a 
signature Cold War mindset.  It does not mean that people are obsessively terrified, all 
of the time, about nuclear war, but it does suggest that there is a lurking dread: nuclear 
war looms over the Cold War as a possible future scenario.  Rare texts, which take 
this fear as their subject, like The Nuclear Age, are therefore valuable. 
What distinguishes it from other literary treatments of nuclear war, of which 
there are many (there are ‘over a thousand depictions of nuclear war and its aftermath’ 
in English according to Paul Brians),10 is that it takes fear itself, not nuclear war per 
se, as its subject.  In an important way, as I discuss in more detail below, when I turn 
to the end of the novel, the subject of The Nuclear Age cannot be resolved.  
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Conventional nuclear texts, in contrast, do resolve the narrative about Cold War 
suspense.  If they are of the nuclear thriller genre – the race against time to avert 
catastrophe – the nuclear threat is removed, in a piece of literary wish-fulfilment, by, 
usually, the heroic actions of the central protagonist.  If, on the other hand, they are 
nuclear disaster fictions, representing nuclear war or its aftermath, they provide a 
different, albeit apocalyptic, sort of closure to the suspense narrative.  They might be 
about the horror of nuclear war (though not all are: in Pat Frank’s Alas, Babylon, for 
instance, nuclear war rather benignly sets up a survivalist situation in which American 
values are rediscovered); they might be rooted in fear; but they remove the element of 
suspense.  This is not to say that there are not complex and interesting texts within this 
genre – Aldous Huxley’s Ape and Essence, Walter Miller’s A Canticle for Leibowitz 
and Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker certainly refute such a claim11 – but by focusing 
on what might happen they distract attention away from the fundamental Cold War 
experience of things not happening. 
The Nuclear Age is distinctive, then, for its focus on the psychological impact 
of the long, drawn-out nuclear suspense of the Cold War.  As such it sits outside the 
more populous groupings of nuclear texts, and is best described as a nuclear anxiety 
fiction.  This anxiety is not simply a conscious fear on the part of the narrator, 
William Cowling, who is frequently self-deceiving about the source of his terrors, but 
connects up in important ways to his personal circumstances and to his sense of the 
fragility of social and family structures.  Most strikingly, it incapacitates him 
politically (overwhelmed by fear, he rejects political action) and physically (his 
periods of fear are accompanied by constipation).  By making the psychological 
physiological, O’Brien suggests that Cold War fear is manifested most profoundly not 
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in stand-offs between nation states, but in one’s sense of oneself, and one’s relation to 
family, friends and society.  
Of course, the psychological trauma represented in The Nuclear Age is not 
simply related to, or explicable in terms of, nuclear suspense.  From his first book, If I 
Should Die in a Combat Zone, the semi-fictionalized account of his tour of duty in 
Vietnam, to July, July, his most recent novel, O’Brien’s fictional worlds are ones in 
which suffering experienced in the past erupts in the present.  Most frequently, this is 
read in terms of the legacy of O’Brien’s own Vietnam experiences.  Mark A. Herbele 
has gone so far as to label O’Brien a ‘trauma artist’, and to suggest that his works 
‘reflect the traumatic circumstances of American postwar [that is, post-Vietnam] life 
more generally’.12  Significantly, Herbele discusses The Nuclear Age and Tomcat In 
Love, texts in which Vietnam is less obviously a focus than in Northern Lights, Going 
After Cacciato, The Things They Carried and In the Lake of the Woods, within this 
paradigm of posttraumatic, Vietnam-related, fiction, and includes as an appendix the 
American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress 
disorder. 
By departing from such readings, this article is not suggesting that they are 
wrong.  Indeed, their approaches are essential to an understanding of O’Brien’s work.  
However, an exclusive focus on O’Brien’s personal trauma and, more broadly, the 
United States’ national trauma in Vietnam, leaves out a different kind of politics.  A 
focus on the ‘events’ of Vietnam misses, in a text like The Nuclear Age, the 
importance of the ‘non-events’ of the threatened nuclear war during the second half of 
the twentieth century.  The Nuclear Age is rendered, by such readings, less significant 
than O’Brien’s other texts simply because it engages less obviously with his personal 
experiences in Vietnam. 
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This article therefore seeks to add another dimension through which we might 
approach The Nuclear Age.  It suggests that the text opens up an understanding of the 
cultural impact of nuclear anxiety, and that it makes sense to read it in these terms, 
tying it into fiction about nuclear suspense, alongside the more obvious contexts of 
O’Brien’s other works and a broader canon of Vietnam literature. 
 
The Nuclear Family in the Nuclear Age 
 
The importance of The Nuclear Age as a key to the Cold War mindset is that it 
explores the dynamics that connect politics on the grand, international scale with the 
intensely personal levels of family units and personal psychological concerns.  
O’Brien does this predominantly by relating anxieties about nuclear war to anxieties 
about the break up of the nuclear family.  A brief précis of the novel will serve to 
illustrate this, as well as to introduce one of O’Brien’s lesser-known texts to the 
unfamiliar reader.13 
 The novel is narrated by William Cowling, one of those christened the 
‘nuclear-haunted’ generation by Michael Mandelbaum (born early in the Cold War 
and whose first conceptual understanding of death would have coincided with the 
extensive public discussion of the nuclear threat in the 1950s).14  William writes from 
the perspective of 1995, a year in which in the novel’s terms (published in 1985) the 
Cold War is ongoing.  At the beginning of the novel, seized by a midnight panic, 
William starts to dig a bomb shelter in his garden.  The novel switches between this 
story of the digging of the shelter, and the story of William’s life from the 1950s to 
this point. 
This latter strand traces his fear of nuclear war as a child; his involvement in, 
and then withdrawal from, radical politics in the 1960s when he dodged the Vietnam 
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draft and, through his girlfriend Sarah Strouch, got involved in a terrorist 
organisation; and the early stages of his relationship with his wife Bobbi.  Finally, it 
depicts his embrace of conformity through the selling of the rights to uranium-rich 
land to a large corporation, as he retires to a comfortable middle-class existence.  The 
other strand, about the shelter-digging in 1995, deals with the resurfacing of his 
nuclear war fears.  It shows the bemused and then frightened reactions of Bobbi and 
his daughter, Melinda, both of whom William imprisons, drugs and eventually 
threatens to blow up along with himself and the hole he has dug. 
It also becomes apparent, and this is the key to the link between the personal 
and the political in the text, that the reappearance of William’s nuclear fears are not 
precipitated by an international crisis, or some other event that puts nuclear weapons 
back on the public agenda.  Instead, his fears of nuclear war erupt when he discovers 
his wife’s diaphragm missing from the bathroom and realises that she is having an 
affair.  In other words, it is a threat not of nuclear war, but of the break up of the 
nuclear family, which prompts William’s desperate dig for shelter.  The intangible 
threat to his home life – (dis)embodied in the absence of Bobbi’s diaphragm from the 
bathroom – is displaced by William into the more dramatic threat of nuclear 
destruction. 
The conceit of linking nuclear family and nuclear war is more than a linguistic 
sleight of hand.  From the dawn of the Cold War, the family was invoked as a 
symbolic buttress against the Soviet nuclear threat. As early as 1953, the acting Civil 
Defense Administrator called for a ‘down-to-earth, home-by-home’ plan for civil 
defence and, rather optimistically, suggested that each American family should 
‘conduct its own evacuation drills to its own scientifically stocked shelter’.15  A 
public information film of the time, The House in the Middle (1954), makes domestic 
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chores within the family home, the heart of preparation for nuclear attack.  In the film, 
three houses are subjected to nuclear blast at the Nevada Proving Grounds, and it is 
the one which is well maintained and cleaned that survives, while its poorly paint
and messy neighbours quickly catch fire.
ed 
attack 
wn 
16  Later in the decade, and into the early 
1960s, as it became apparent that public civil defence programmes were both too 
costly, and too ineffectual, to implement, the fiction of protection from nuclear 
was maintained by shifting the emphasis in civil defence material all the more overtly 
onto encouraging private citizens, and particularly family groups, to make their o
preparations for nuclear war. 
 The slippage in the novel between William’s fears of nuclear war, and 
personal / sexual anxieties, particularly those to do with being emasculated, therefore 
reveals more than William’s personal trauma.  It also cannot help but reveal the way 
in which the overwhelming power of the bomb is inscribed in public discourse as an 
ever-present, but also strangely absent (invisible; intangible) threat, located in a 
ground zero at the heart of the family home. 
Throughout the novel, William’s fears of nuclear war are never divorced from 
personal, and particularly sexual, anxieties, sliding from one to the other in revealing 
ways.  When William recalls doubting his own sanity as a child, he refutes his own 
fears that he might be ‘wacko’ by asserting that you ‘can’t use faggy-ass psychology 
to explain away the bomb’ (15).  The sense that the problem might lie in his own 
mind, in psychology, is dismissed by William with a homophobic comment here, but 
the vehemence with which he asserts this suggests that he may be repressing doubts 
about his own sexuality.  The presence of the bomb, held in perpetual threat above 
him, is the alternative that William would like to believe is the source of all his 
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troubles, and his narrative therefore sets it up as virile and potent in contrast to the 
‘faggy-ass’ psychology whose implications he would rather not explore. 
 Significantly, this passage segues directly into one where William uses pencils 
stolen from school to reinforce a crude bomb shelter he has built from a table tennis 
table, reasoning that the lead in the pencils will protect him from atomic fallout.  He 
therefore reacts against a possible explanation for his actions (faggy-ass psychology) 
by committing himself all the more fiercely to his fears of nuclear war.  What 
William, the child, does not realise until it is pointed out to him by his parents, is that 
the graphite in the pencils is not real lead and will not protect him.  William, the novel 
implies, does not have lead in his pencil.  Concerned by their son’s nuclear 
obsessions, William’s parents seek medical advice and, yet again, a sexual trauma is 
alluded to, this time produced by a bad memory of the doctor: ‘when I was seven or 
eight, I had this embarrassing bicycle accident, a bad spill, and the damned bike came 
down on top of me and I ended up with a mangled pecker….  [Doc Crenshaw] started 
to sew me up, no anesthetic, no nothing and naturally I squealed and squirmed 
around…’ (18-19). 
 These events should not lead us to read William’s nuclear fears simply as 
displaced psychological manifestations of a troubled sexuality.  Instead, the novel 
implies that there is a continuity between these local concerns and the global nuclear 
threat.  In both arenas he is emasculated.  In both his personal life, and in his dawning 
political consciousness, he encounters a frustrating sense of enforced (or what he 
perceives to be enforced) passivity.  Held in a state of suspense, he lacks the 
wherewithal to take control of his personal life (when in trouble, for instance, he seeks 
comfort not in actual connection with others, but in pretending to talk on the 
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telephone to, at various times, Sarah Strouch, his parents and his therapist), and feels 
unable to do anything about the Cold War standoff that threatens annihilation. 
His response, as his hole-digging implies, is simply to dig in and seek shelter.  
Unlike the radical activists with whom he associates as a student, ‘underground’ does 
not mean something subversive here, but is instead a place of retreat from political 
engagement.  Indeed, his narrative is peppered with images of comforting, womb-like 
spaces: ‘Cozy and walled in and secure….  [M]y motives may have been anchored in 
some ancestral craving for refuge….  The mole in his hole.  The turtle in his shell’ 
(15).  This also recalls the nuclear shelter that Perry and Harvey’s dying, fire-and-
brimstone preaching father implores them to dig in O’Brien’s Northern Lights.  Here, 
too, the shelter implies retreat, denial and a refusal to engage.  It is Harvey, the more 
self-deceiving of the brothers, who digs the shelter and who, in retreat from the 
trauma of his experiences in Vietnam, resists selling both it and the family home.  
Here, too, the nuclear threat is articulated as one aimed primarily at male sexuality: 
the shelter will provide protection from the radiation that will, in a repeated image, rot 
‘a man’s testicles’.17 
 The urge to bury oneself, to dig in deep to escape a sense of threat that is 
configured as coming from above, is apparent in texts by other writers that might be 
described as having a dimension of nuclear anxiety to them.  Michael Mandelbaum, 
writing about the cultural impact of the nuclear age, singles out Joseph Heller’s 
Catch-22, Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow as significant texts, in which there is a fear of exposure (209).  Although all 
are set during the Second World War, each in its concern with aerial bombardment, 
tone of black humour and sense of the absurd is characteristic of the nuclear age.  We 
might add to Mandelbaum’s list, E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, which finds its 
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nuclear context by retelling the story of the execution of the Rosenbergs, for the 
alleged passing of atomic secrets to the Russians. 
 While William seeks protection in the shelter he digs, Doctorow’s novel 
features a narrator, Daniel, who warms to a family friend, Ben Cohen, because of the 
safety his job, working underground in the subway, affords him: ‘… a really fine job.  
You’re underground in a stronghold that has barred windows, and a heavy steel door 
that locks from the inside….  If a bomb drops, you probably won’t even feel it.  If 
there’s a storm, you don’t get wet.’18  In contrast, Daniel feels exposed in the family 
home, which should be his refuge: ‘It was the way the wind could sweep up the hill 
over the schoolyard right at his house and, during a storm, actually make the inside 
wall near the front door wet that alarmed Daniel.  The sky here offered no protection, 
it was too open’ (92).  Just as O’Brien locates William’s nuclear fear at the most 
personal of levels (his sexuality; his family; his constipated insides), so Doctorow 
locates the impact of nuclear fears in the image of the threatened domestic space.  
 This focus on states of mind, on the impact of terror, and on the transference 
of that terror into personal relationships, is highly significant to the ways in which the 
nuclear era is coded into these texts.  As has been frequently noted, the value of 
nuclear weapons to nation states during the Cold War was not for their military use (to 
use them was suicide), but for the impact the threat of their use might have.  They 
were, pre-eminently, psychological weapons. 
By default, if not by design, the nuclear stand-off was tantamount to the 
waging of psychological warfare by the governments of the world on their own 
citizens.  In 1948, the US Army defined psychological warfare as that which ‘employs 
any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy.  The weapons are psychological only 
in the effect they produce and not because of the nature of the weapons themselves….  
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They are effective because they produce dissension, distrust, fear and hopelessness in 
the minds of the enemy….’ 19  Nuclear weapons fit this definition because they are 
not made to be used; they are made to terrify the enemy into submission.  The 
enemy’s only defence against them is to use their own nuclear arsenal in the same 
way, so that the terror projected at the enemy gets reflected back on one’s ow
citizens.  Furthermore, the value of a nuclear arsenal in such a situation lies not in 
keeping it secret, but in publicising its existence and talking up one’s willingness 
use it:  political discourse of the period is characterised by bellicose statements of 
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Such a situation produces, to use an apposite metaphor, psychological 
cultural fallout and raises an important question.  What are the psychological 
consequences of living in a society which is effectively, in Mandelbaum’s words, hel
‘hostage’ to the ‘good behaviour’ of its political establishment? (110).  The Nuclear 
Age’s investigation of this issue takes us not only into William’s troubled psyche, but 
also into fundamental questions (posed e
relations betwee
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At issue within The Nuclear Age, as within so many of O’Brien’s novels, is the 
relationship between language and the reality it encodes and shapes.  The pres
concern for William is a possible nuclear war, and much of the frustration he 
experiences stems from the refusal of others to accept that his words convey a 
fundamental truth about the world in which they live.  As a consequence his abiding 
refrain is that reality is there, that it is tangible and that the words he uses to describe 
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(and, significantly, a poet), insists on the metaphorical function of language.  Their 
different perspectives are produced in their very different styles of discourse. 
 William’s perspective is that words reflect reality and his discourse strives to 
establish a one-to-one relationship between words and things.  For example, when he 
describes his hometown he reduces it to some key statistics:  
  A mountain town. 
  Elevation, just under six thousand feet. 
   Population, just over a thousand. 
 Ranch country.  Scrub grass and pine dust.  An old hitching 
post in front of the Strouch Funeral home.  A courthouse, a cemetery, 
the Ben Franklin store. (11) 
The dearth of verbs in this passage indicates a discourse seeking certainty and reality, 
and it is a discourse that Cowling extends to his attempts to communicate the 
possibility of nuclear holocaust.  What follows is a perspective not only on nuclear 
war, but on language: ‘There are no metaphors,’ William says, ‘[t]here is only science 
when I say ‘Nuclear War’ (126).  By invoking the authority of science, and scientific 
discourse, William seeks to undermine the power of metaphor, and other creative uses 
of language, to engage with reality.  
 Unsurprisingly Bobbi, as a poet, takes a different view.  To William’s 
consternation she repeatedly opens up the ways in which science and politics operate 
as discourse.  Against his proclamations that science is not metaphor, we can place 
her poems, written to him during his frenzied shelter digging, and which, with titles 
like ‘Fission’ and ‘The Balance of Power’, invoke the terminologies of science and 
Cold War politics as metaphors for family life.  For Bobbi, the language of power and 
control, and the way of thinking that accompanies it, resonates between every scale of 
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human interaction, from the global dimension of Cold War politics and the relations 
between nation states, to the microcosmic level of intra-family dynamics.  After all, 
William’s final threat to destroy himself, avenging his wife’s infidelity by dynamiting 
the hole in which he holds his family hostage, is an aggressive and suicidal posture 
like that adopted in the nuclear strategic policy of Mutual Assured Destruction.  
William’s emasculation in public life (his solution to the nuclear threat is not to 
campaign for disarmament, but simply to dig in, accepting his own weakness), forces 
him to act in much the same way as the nuclear strategists he fears. 
 William’s response to the instabilities of language, exposed by Bobbi, is to fall 
back on his certainties, both about the outcome of the Cold War, and about language.  
‘Bobbi doesn’t understand,’ he comments at one point, ‘[s]he’s a poet, she can’t help 
it.  I’ve tried to talk things out.  I’ve presented the facts.  I’ve named names.  
Poseidon, Trident, Cruise, Stealth, Minuteman, Lance, Pershing – the indisputable 
realities.  Trouble is, Bobbi can’t process hard data’ (58).  Yet, these instabilities are 
found also within his own discourse, not only that of Bobbi.  Throughout his 
narrative, words and phrases take on multiple meanings, opening up the instabilities 
he fears.  For instance, at one point Sarah says that she loves William because of 
‘chemistry’.  Yet, two pages later, the word takes on other meanings when, hiking in 
the mountains, they find evidence of uranium.  When Sarah asks how William knows 
it is uranium, he says, simply, ‘chemistry’ (108-10).  Other words and phrases – 
‘relativity’ (297),  ‘chain reaction’ (251), ‘escalation’ (214), ‘inviolable heart’ (206) 
and ‘congress’ (105), for instance – are similarly inflected in the text, functioning 
metaphorically to describe not only nuclear science or political bodies, but also 
personal relations.  
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 William’s insistence that language only express ‘indisputable realities’ is, 
then, in some ways exposed as naïve.  However, in contrast to other critics, I want to 
argue that his view of language, and of reality, is not entirely written off by the novel.  
Indeed, a close reading suggests that his point about there being a Cold War reality, 
which we evade and from which we hide, is maintained in the text.   
 Critics tend to focus approvingly on a change of heart by William at the end of 
the book, when he frees his wife and child and suppresses his own fears of nuclear 
war.  The implication of this reading is that the problem is entirely within his mind: 
the bombs are not real and William’s paranoia is all that is at issue.  It is worth 
quoting the novel’s final sentence in full because it encapsulates William’s new 
perspective, as he learns to live with his fear, and discussion of it reveals why my 
reading differs from that of other critics: 
I will live my life in the conviction that when it finally happens – when we 
hear that midnight whine, when Kansas burns, when what is done is undone, 
when fail-safe fails, when deterrence no longer deters, when the jig is at last 
up – yes, even then I will hold to a steadfast orthodoxy, confident to the end 
that E will somehow not quote equal mc2, that it’s a cunning metaphor, that the 
terminal equation will somehow not quite balance. (312) 
Lee Schweninger’s reading of this ending is as a moment of anagnorisis for William: 
‘O’Brien’s narrator maintains finally a faith that is hope.  In an ecofeminist world, he 
will discard the modern acceptance of mathematical equations as the only truth….  
His is a post-modern, ecofeminist vision, a vision of justice among groups, races, 
sexes, species.’21  This is a reading of the novel as bildungsroman: William’s 
reflections on life, as he digs the shelter, lead him to a new and mature outlook.  
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However, this perspective is far too simplistic for two reasons, both to do with 
William’s denial of the truth. 
 First, it assumes that the complications and threats of violence that accompany 
William’s relations with his family can simply be written off and left behind.  Yet, 
although he achieves some self-knowledge, admitting on the final page that one day 
‘my wife will leave me’, he also persists in his denial of this fact: ‘I know this, but I 
believe otherwise’ (312).  He still refuses to accept the instability of the nuclear 
family.  Surely, too, it cannot be long before his wife leaves, taking their daughter 
with her: William has, after all, imprisoned Bobbi and Melinda, drugged them and 
very nearly blown them up. 
 Second, and crucially, William’s new-found confidence at the end of the 
novel, that the threat posed by the bombs is insignificant, is surely not a moment of 
‘vision’ as Schweninger would have us believe.  If it is, there is nothing in the text to 
suggest what this vision might be, and no hint that he has found the ‘justice among 
groups, races, sexes, species’ that Schweninger rather ambitiously claims.  The novel 
offers no alternative to replace the ‘mathematical equations’ which William is 
confident will fail to balance, and it is hard to see the circumstances under which E 
will fail to equal mc2, and under which the missiles will fail to explode, should they be 
launched. 
 Furthermore, the revised political perspective into which William retreats does 
not offer the radical new perspective Schweninger implies.  In the final paragraph he 
vows to ‘firm up my golf game and invest wisely and adhere to the conventions of 
decency and good grace’ (312).  This is not a radical ‘ecofeminist vision’ but a 
suburban fantasy, acquiescent to the primacy of the political status quo, and as much 
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of a hole in which to shelter as the one he has dug in the garden.  It is an admission 
that nothing can be done in the face of power. 
 Jacqueline Foertsch’s reading is more sophisticated and contextualises the 
novel interestingly in terms of other depictions of psychological disturbance in 
nuclear texts (indeed, my own reading is broadly indebted to her claim that the Cold 
War ‘was not in fact characterized by Soviet- or U.S.- detonated attacks, but by the 
tension-filled and exhausting constant deferral of these,’ and that, therefore, 
‘depictions of cold war daily life [are] … pathologized as sickness’).22  She 
acknowledges that, for all William’s eccentricities and the dangers he poses, he is at 
least ‘not carrying out life in a false and self-delusory register which refuses to 
confront the nuclear threat (real or trumped up) in the enormity of its psychic 
debilitation’ (475).  Yet, her reading of the ending, like Schweninger’s, also suggests 
a turnaround in William’s perspective that would involve exactly this sort of denial.  
She claims, although we only have William’s word for it, that his family ‘begin to 
forgive and reaccept him’ (478) and that the ending allows him ‘to rebuild in the 
direction of secured physical well-being and mental health’ (479).  He may indeed, as 
she implies, have found a means of living with the bomb, but it involves a denial of 
the real threat it poses, and exactly the sort of psychic numbing of which Lifton 
writes. 
 David Dowling takes a similar position to Foertsch.  He acknowledges that 
there is a knowing retreat to ‘the fiction of a happy ending’, but implies that this 
retreat is tacitly approved of in the text: ‘there is a sense of communal confession and 
affirmation as we join William’ in his final vision.23 
 Although all of these readings offer some interesting insights into The Nuclear 
Age, they are flawed in assuming that our final perspective should mirror that of 
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William.  He is, after all, a profoundly untrustworthy narrator.  In these readings the 
novel reaches closure because William finds a way to live with the nuclear threat.  
What goes before the ending, however, surely shows this to be self-deception on 
William’s part.  As readers, therefore, we are alienated from William’s new vision 
and we cannot achieve the sense of closure that he finds.  The sense of threat and 
suspense under which he lives, and which has such debilitating effects earlier in the 
book, is shared by us. 
 The novel often depicts images of nuclear technology bursting out from 
below, as if from the subconscious: a missile rises into the air as William lies on a 
riverbank (70-71), and a submarine surfaces next to him as he floats in a boat off the 
Florida coast (238-39).  (Indeed, it is unclear in these episodes, if they are actually 
taking place or if they are hallucinations of William’s troubled mind).  The fact that, 
at the end of the novel, William represses these images of the weapons he fears, does 
not mean that the threat no longer exists.  Indeed, the point he makes in a mute student 
protest, earlier in the novel, remains relevant: initiating campus resistance to the 
Vietnam War, he turns up at the canteen and stands silently with a sign that says, 
simply, ‘THE BOMBS ARE REAL’ (74).  Nothing in the novel’s denouement would 
lead us to conclude that this statement is untrue.  William may be naïve in his 
assumption that language can simply name reality in a one-to-one correspondence, but 
it is equally naïve to commit entirely to the opposite view and assume that nothing 
exists outside of language. 
 The novel, therefore, explicitly refuses to resolve the tension between the two 
alternatives – madness (shelter digging) and denial (conformity) – acted out by 
William in the course of his narrative.  What it does do, though, is investigate the 
problems of political engagement in the face of paralysing fear. 
 21
Digging his shelter, late in the Cold War, but at a time when it seems the 
standoff between NATO and the Eastern Bloc can never end, William rejects radical 
politics (‘no more crusades now’) and focuses on personal survival: ‘Call it what you 
want – copping out, dropping out, numbness, the loss of outrage, simple fatigue.  I’ve 
retired.  Time to retrench.  Time to dig in.  Safety first’ (8).  The retreat to the shelter 
is therefore a retreat from politics.  However, it is also, paradoxically, a retreat that 
allows O’Brien to make the nature of the Cold War environment and politics 
apparent.  It focuses attention on the dangerous, threatening world, concealed behind 
the façade of the happy family life William was meant to live.   
This doubleness is conveyed in the novel by a structure of images contrasting 
dirt with cleanliness.  Digging in the garden, William naturally becomes sweaty and 
dirty and compares this with the cleanliness of the domestic environment he has left 
behind: ‘The house smells of Windex and wax. . . . .  Holes aren’t clean.  Safety can 
be very messy’ (6).  Later in the novel he imagines a reunion of his radical college 
contemporaries, in which they have ceased to sing protest songs, like ‘Give peace a 
chance’, in preference for advertising jingles about cleaning products: ‘Mr. Clean will 
clean your whole house, and everything that’s in it’ (131). 
William may, therefore, be turning his back on the radical politics of his 
youth, but he is also rejecting the pretence that accumulation of money (he is rich by 
this point) and accumulation of consumer products can do anything other than hide 
the lurking threat of the Cold War.  By abandoning the house – the realm of Windex, 
Mr. Clean and other consumables designed to sterilise and sanitise the domestic 
environment – he is abandoning a world which pretends that domestic cleanliness, and 
capitalist aspiration, is enough to guarantee safety, for a world which acknowledges 
that political realities threaten that very notion of safety.  Safety cannot be bought by 
 22
participating in a lifestyle of capitalist consumption.  As he digs down he unearths for 
us the suppressed anxiety, frustration and paralysis of the Cold War.  At the end of the 
novel he may return to the house and the pretence that it is proof against the dangers 
of the Cold War, and particularly of the bomb, but as readers we can see the scale of 
this self-delusion. 
The Nuclear Age articulates, then, an anxiety that finds little direct expression 
in other literature.24  It reflects on the impact of the virtual, mental constructions 
through which nuclear conflict was imagined during the Cold War and which, over an 
extended period, hovered in people’s minds as a possible future scenario by which it 
could have reached its conclusion.  While the physical consequences of the Cold War 
detonating into a nuclear exchange were unimaginably terrible, its real existence ‘in 
dreams, in imagination’, produced its own set of casualties.  It is precisely in its 
preoccupation with things not happening that The Nuclear Age is a significant text.  It 
suggests that, while the overt events of the Cold War, like the Vietnam conflict which 
dominates so much of O’Brien’s fiction, are important, the politics of threat, of fear, is 
equally vital.  Engaging with such intangible, psychological states is a prerequisite for 
an understanding of Cold War culture. 
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